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By FREnmucK W WHITESIDE, JR.*
INTRODUCTION: UPDATING TM CODE
When Kentucky adopted the Uniform Commercial Code by
action of the 1958 General Assembly, the draft which became
law was the 1957 Official Text as promulgated by the American
Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws. As anticipated, some errors were dis-
covered later and improvements were suggested by the sponsors
of the Code. This ultimately resulted in an improved 1958
Official Text. Updating of the Kentucky Code to conform to the
1958 Official Text is the main accomplishment, and comprises the
greatest portion, of the 1962 Kentucky legislation relating to the
Code. While some of the amended sections constitute minor
nnprovement m wording and changes to clarify the relation
between different sections, others are of major importance.
One inportant substantive change achieved by the 1958 Of-
ficial Text is m article 9, section 412(4), relating to the priority
to be accorded purchase money security interests in collateral
other than inventory Under the Code these interests may be
superior even to valid security interests in after-acquired property
under previously filed financing statements. In order to be al-
lowed such priority, the 1957 version required that a purchase
money security interest in such collateral, let us say equipment
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky.
1 Ky. Acts 1962, ch. 83, at 802 (effective June 14, 1962), codified m
scattered sections of Ky. Rev. Stat. chs. 355, 382, 186 (1962) [hereinafter cited
as KRS]. While the 1958 Official Text of the Uniform Commercial Code as
promulgated by the Amencan Law Institute and the Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws (hereinafter cited as UCC) is the law which has now
been codified in KRS Chapter 355 (happily without the change m numbering
found m some other adopting states) there are several significant Kentucky
deviations from the Official Text discussed in this article. Since the Kentucky
enactment is now for the most part the same as the 1958 Official Text both will
be referred to herein as the "Code", and any pertinent Kentucky deviations from
the Official Text will be specifically noted as such.
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used in the debtor s business, be perfected by filing at the time
the debtor received possession.2 Tis was unrealistic. The seller
does not withhold delivery of possession of a truck the purchaser
wants in his business until notice of the security interest can be
filed in the County Clerk s office. The sale might be consummated
and possession be transferred after hours or on a holiday In
recognition of the common business practice of selling the prop-
erty subject to the seller s valid security interest therein for the
purchase price if he files within a reasonable tune, the 1962
amendment gives the secured seller ten days after delivery of
possession within which to file.3 It will be noticed that the
liberalization of article 9, section 312(4), to allow ten days
for perfection of a purchase money security interest m goods
delivered to the debtor is comparable to the time allowed for
perfection of such purchase money interests in order to take
priority over the rights of lien creditors and transferees m bulk.
One other minor discrepancy in the wording of the Kentucky and
the official version was likewise corrected by the 1962 amend-
ment. The law now requires the purchase money interest to be
perfected within ten days after "the collateral comes into pos-
session of the debtor" instead of the former time, "after he gives
value."5
REVISION OF PRIOR LEGISLATION INCONSISTENT wi CODE
The changes of the 1962 amendment include one needed,
though minor, tidying-up job, modifying two long-standing pro-
visions in Kentucky s statutes which offered potential conflict
2Ky. Acts 1958, ch. 77, §9-312(4), at 399-401 codified as KRS 855.9-412.
The seriousness of this error was pointed out in Knpe, Kentucky Modermzes the
Law of Chattel Security, 48 Ky. L.J. 369, 384 (1960). The previously filed
financing statement may be broad enough to cover the newly purchased inventory
by means of an after-acquired property clause in the statement or by a subsequent
security agreement covenng the property.
3 See National Conference of Commnissioners on Uniform State Laws, Urn-
form Laws Annotated, 1958 Supplement to Uniform Commercial Code §9-312(4),
connent at 17 (1958); Knpke, supra note 2, at 384 (recommending amendment
to adopt 1958 version).
4 UCC §9-301(2) provides:
If the secured party files with respect to a purchase money security
interest before or within ten days after the collateral comes into ossession of
the debtor, he takes priority over the rights of a transferee in bulk or of a
lien creditor which anse between the time the security interest attaches and
the time of filing.
5 Ky. Acts 1962, ch. 83, § 6, at 307. This was recommended in Witeside
& Lewis, Kentucky s Comerceal Code-Some Initial Problems n Security, 50 Ky.
Y.Y. 65, 81 (1961),
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with the Code. These provisions are to be found in the chapter
of the Kentucky statutes affecting conveyances, which contains
typical provisions requiring acknowledgements 6 and statement of
the maturity dates7 prerequisite to recording deeds and mort-
gages. The Court of Appeals in Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v.
Queenan8 had already held these provisions to be inapplicable to
financing statements under the Code. To make clear, in accord-
ance with the Court of Appeals decision, that such provisions are
inherently inconsistent with the basic principle governing the
filing of a simple form of financing statement under the Code,
the amendment phrases the statute so that the two requirements
have no application to personal property security transactions
under the Code but apply only to real property transactions to
be recorded.9
The last section of the 1962 amendment repeals additional
statutory provisions in other chapters of the statutes determined
to be inconsistent with or at least overlapping the Uniform
Commercial Code.'0 Among these are nearly all the remainder
of the old statutory sections affecting chattel mortgages,:" repeal
of which had been overlooked at the time the Code was first
enacted, certain sections m the banking laws affecting the pay-
ment and non-payment of checks,' 2 and an inconsistent provision
in the laws affecting cooperatives which would subordinate "crop
mortgages to the rights of agricultural cooperatives under market-
mg contracts." 2
DEPARTURES FROM UNiFoRMrEY BY KENTUCKY LEGISLATION
SUBSEQUENT TO CODE
A year ago Professor Lewis and I deplored the piecemeal
amendment of the Uniform Commercial Code by new legislation
6 KRS 382.270.
7KRS 382.330.
8344 S.W.2d 838 (Ky. 1961).
9 Ky. Acts 1952, ch. 83, §16, at 320, amends KRS 382.270, with reference to
the requirement to eliminate the words "or personal" modifying the word "prop-
erty." Similarly Ky. Acts 1962, ch. 83, §17, at 320, adds the words "covering real
property" in connection with the requirement of maturity date in KRS 882.330.
See Whiteside & Lewis, supra note 5, at 68-69 (recommending smilar amend-
ment).
'0 Ky. Acts 1962, ch. 83, §21, at 326.




subsequently passed.14 Some of this new legislation can be found
in the form of amendments to the Code itself, whereas other such
legislation is scattered throughout the Kentucky statutes, to the
attorney's dismay Happily, some, though by no means all, of this
tampering with the Code through passage of related inconsistent
legislation, has been corrected by the 1962 Legislature.
Examples of this piecemeal tampering through the passage
of other statutes outside the Code are found m four miscellaneous
provisions added by the 1960 General Assembly to that part of
the chapter on "Conveyances and Encumbrances," which dealt
with chattel mortgages. The 1962 amendment merely transposes
these provisions to the appropriate section in article 9 of the Code,
repealing the prior 1960 provisions. This follows the recom-
mendation made m 1961 that changes in the Code should be
made m the Code provisions themselves but departs from the
recommendations made for their repeal. The first such provision15
adds to the Code description of what the financing statement
must contain, the requirement that, if the collateral is consumer
goods "normally carrying a serial number," the description and
serial number of each item must appear in the financing state-
ment. If the collateral is a motor vehicle the motor number or
identification number as well as the make, model and year must
also be given. This provision complicates the simple form of
financing statement prescribed in the Code, adding a requirement
not found in the statutes of other states which have adopted the
UCC. Further, since many small items may not generally be
known to carry serial numbers, there seems to be an additional
trap for the umnitiated.1" Short of repeal, there is some comfort
to attorneys in the fact that the requirement is now to be found
m the appropriate Code provision rather than in the overlapping,
now obsolete chattel mortgage statute.
14 See Whiteside & Lewis, supra note 5.
15 KRS 355.9-402(1), as amended, Ky. Acts 1962, ch. 83, §10, at 312. The
original statute, containing identical language, was KRS 382.770, enacted Ky. Acts
1960, ch. 13, §1, repealed Ky. Acts 1962, ch. 83, §1, repealed Ky. Acts 1962, ch.
83, §21, at 326.106 Recommendation for complete repeal of this provision for the reasons
stated was made m Whiteside & Lewis, supra note 5, at 79. As to motor vehicles,
some justification for retention of the requirement arises from the failure of Ken-
tucky to adopt an adequate certificate-of-title or motor velucle registration law
to prowde necessary safeguards against traffic m stolen vehicles. See discussion
p. 12 nfra for recommendation of certificate-of-title law.
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A second such provision,1 7 now transposed from the repealed
chattel mortgage statutes to section 9-402 of the Code, requires
that when the indebtedness secured is expected to exceed $200
the financing statement shall so state. Apart from an objection
based purely upon the departure from the language of the urn-
form act as adopted in other states, it has been pointed out that
such a provision "seems to have no legitimate purpose in modem
financing, especially in the field of inventory financing where a
floating lien upon shifting stocks of merchandise may be created
to secure varying amounts of present and future indebtedness." 8
At least the writers recommending repeal of this requirement can
find some solace in the fact that the requirement now appears in
the Code itself rather than being tucked away in the prior over-
lapping provisions on chattel mortgages, which should have been
repealed when the Code first became effective.
A similar inprovement by the 1962 amendment is the repeal
of the old statute requiring that a continuation of a financing
statement be identified by date as well as by file number 9 and its
reenactment as an amendment added to the section of the Code
itself which relates to continuation statements. -20
Another departure by Kentucky from the uniform version of
the Code is in relation to the filing of a termination statement
when there is no longer any indebtedness. The uniform version
requires the secured party to file a terminmation statement when he
no longer has a security interest within ten days upon demand by
the debtor, with no such requirement in the absence of a demand
by the debtor. The Kentucky Code provides, in addition to the
required statement within ten days after demand by the debtor,
that the secured creditor shall file, even in the absence of such
demand, a termination statement within thirty days after the
secured transaction has terminated.2' Here again, Kentucky s
departure was first enacted in 1960,22 and perpetuated in 1962.23
'7 KRS 355.9-402(1) (The last sentence is added to the section by Ky. Acts
1962, ch. 83, §10, at 312.) The original statute containing identical language
was KRS 382.780, enacted, Ky. Acts 1960, ch. 13, §2, repealed, Ky. Acts 1962,
ch. 83, §21, at 326.18 Whiteside & Lewis, supra note 5, at 80.
19 Ky. Acts 1960, ch. 11, §1, repealed Ky. Acts 1962, ch. 83, §21, at 326.
20 KRS 355.9-403, -404.
21 KRS 355.9-404(2).
2 2 Ky. Acts 1960, ch. 53, repealed, Ky. Acts 1962, ch. 83, §21, at 326. This
(Continued on next page)
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WHERE To FLE
Almost as important as updating Kentucky s Code by adoption
of the latest text, and coordinating related legislation with the
Code, are the new provisions regarding the proper place for filing
financial statements. This was made necessary by Kentucky s
rejection of the Code's plan of centralized filing on a state-wide
basis m favor of the time-honored scheme of local filing. Ken-
tucky s first version, in providing for local filing m all cases, desig-
nated the County Clerk s office (m the county of the debtor's resi-
dence, or the county where the goods were kept when the debtor
was not a resident of Kentucky) as the proper place to file for
"goods," but omitted the catch-all provision found in the Official
Text which, "in all other cases" provides for centralized filing in
the office of the Secretary of State.24 The 1962 amendment cor-
rects this defect comprehensively by specifying the Mling pro-
visions to govern all situations. 5 The proper place to file is now
as follows: (1) for consumer goods, farm equipment, or farm
products (including also accounts, contract rights or general in-
tangibles arising from or relatmg to the sale of farm products by
a farmer),2 filing must be made m the office of the County Court
Clerk (a) m the county of the debtors residence or (b) m the
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
bill became a part of the overlapping, half-way inconsistent chapter on chattel
mortgages still unre ealed when the Code first became effective in Kentucky.
KRS 382.790. See aso the study by the Legislative Research Commission made
prior to adoption of the Code, recogmzmg the practical impossibility of the task
of isolation for repeal all statutes which nght potentialy conflict with the Code
provisions. Legislative Research Comm n, Pub. No. 49, Analysis of Effects of
Uniform Commercial Code on Kentucky Law, appendix II, at 299 (1957). This
portion of the statute on chattel mortgages was among the statutes listed as
"representative of those affected in varying degree by the adoption of the
Code. Some of these statutes should be repealed, some amended and
others left unchanged."23 Ky. Acts 1962, ch. 83, § 12, at 315 [transposing the provision to KRS
355.9-404(2)].
24 Uniform Commercial Code, 1958 Official Text (Joint Committee on Con-
tinung Legal Education, 1958). UCC §9-401. Recommendation to correct this
defect was first made in Hatton, Security Interests Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 25 Ky. S.B.J. 105, 110 (1961); Whiteside & Lewis, supra note 5, at 82.25 Ky. Acts 1962, ch. 83, §8, at 311, amending KRS 355.9-401(1).26 Although "farmer" is not defined, KRS 855.9-109 defines "farm products"
as follows:
"Fai'm products" if they are crops or livestock or supplies used or produced
in farming operations or if they are products of crops or livestock in their
uninanufactured states (such as ginned cotton, wool-clip, maple syrup, milk
and eggs), and if they are in the possession of a debtor engaged in raising,
fattening, grazing or other farming operations. If goods are farm products
they are neither equipment or inventory.
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county where the goods are kept if the debtor is not a resident of
Kentucky;27 (2) if the farm products consist of crops, then the
proper county in which to fie is where the crops are growing or
to be grown;28 and (8) in the case of all other types of collateral
(which may include inventory, equipment, documents, chattel
paper, accounts receivable and general intangibles) filing of the
financing statement is properly made (a) in the office of the
County Court Clerk in the county of the debtor's residence if the
debtor is a resident of Kentucky, or (b) in the county of the
debtor's principal place of business if the debtor is not a resident
of Kentucky but has a principal place of business in Kentucky, or
(c) in the office of the Secretary of State in Frankfort if the debtor
is non-resident and does not have a principal place of business in
Kentucky2 This new law by its explicit provisions should clear
up most of the problems as to the proper place for filing. It
should be borne in mind that even though filing is made in an
improper place, if made in good faith, it is nevertheless effective
with regard to any person with knowledge of the financing state-
ment and with regard to any collateral as to which the filing was
in compliance with the statute.30
Let us assume that the debtor with regard to collateral con-
sisting of inventory or accounts receivable is a corporation rather
than an individual debtor, as would frequently be the case. Some
problems may remain unanswered. If the corporate debtor has a
principal place of business within Kentucky, the county where
that business is located is the proper county in which to file the
financing statement whether or not the corporation is incorpo-
rated in Kentucky It may also be necessary to file in the state
where the corporation is incorporated. If, however, the debtor
corporation is incorporated in Kentucky but has its principal place
of business in another state it is probable that filing should be
according to the laws governing there, assuming incorporation
under the Kentucky corporation laws did not make the corpora-
tion a "resident" of Franklin County, Kentucky, or the county
where the corporation has an agent for service of process. Even
27 KRS 355.9-401(1) (a).
28 KRS 355.9-401(1)(a).
29 KS 355.9-401(1) (c).
30 KRS 355.9-401(2).
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if the Kentucky incorporation made the debtor corporation a Ken-
tucky resident, filing in both states is indicated."1
MOTOR VEMICLES
In Kentucky there are special problems concerning the inter-
relationship of the filing provisions of the Code and the motor
vehicle title registration law which present no difficulty in most
states adopting the Code. By virtue of the Code provisions
designed to integrate the Code with the certificate-of-title statutes,
compliance with the latter provision is the exclusive way to
perfect security interests in motor vehicles and the Code filing
provisions do not apply 3 2 The Code thus contemplates the pos-
sibility of an exclusive method of perfection under the adopting
state s motor vehicle statute if the latter provides the necessary
pathway by insunng notice through a system of notation on the
title certificate. Otherwise it would seem to contemplate the
alternative of an exclusive way of perfection under the Code filing
provisions. It is difficult to justify a system requiring double
perfection.
Double perfection, however, is the practical effect of the
solution to the problem reached by the court in Lncoln Bank &
Trust Co. v. Queenan 3 with regard to motor vehicles constituting
consumer goods or equipment m the hands of the debtor. There
must be compliance with both the filing requirements of the Code
and the procedures for notation of liens under the motor vehicle
registration statute. Several statutory provisions were cited by
the court as leading inevitably to this result.3 4 Though the court
s1 For a discussion of the problem, see Hatton, Security Interest Under the
Uniform Commerctal Code, 25 Ky. S.B.J. 105, 110 (1961).32 KRS 355.9-302(3), (4).
33 344 S.W.2d 383 (Ky. 1961).
34 Tethree provisions, showing an intention that Code filing in addition
to notation on the registration receipt was intended, were:
(1) "The lien instrument referred to in 186.195 shall be filed in the
same manner as financing statements are required to be filed by KRS
Chapter 355" (KRS 382.740, repealed by Ky. Acts 1962, ch. 83, §21, at
326);
(2) If the property intended as collateral is consumer goods at the
time the financing statement required by KRS 355.9-402 is filed, and if
the property is an automobile (KRS 382.770, repealed in 1962 and
placed in the Code requirement for financing statements, Ky. Acts 1962,
ch. 83, §10, §21, at 312, 326).(3) "Whenever a lien instrument affecting a motor vehicle is presented to
a county clerk for recording in any county other than the one in which
the motor vehicle is registered " [KRS 186.195(e)].
[Vol. 1,
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recognized that perfection of a security interest m a registered
motor vehicle is accomplished by filing the financing statement
under the Code, just as would be done for other property, the
court found a way to put teeth in the lien notation statute 5
through its interpretation that the county clerk may refuse to file
the financing statement until the lien is noted upon the registra-
tion receipt.36
The 1962 legislation mirrors the dual compliance result of the
Queenan case by amending KRS 186.195, the provision which
requires the notation of security interests in motor vehicles on the
registration receipt. Throughout the section the words "financing
statement" are substituted for the former words "lien instrument"
m the description of what must be presented, together with the
registration receipt showing the security interest, to the county
clerk for "recording."3 7 It is clear that there must be filed with the
clerk both the registration receipt showing the security interest
and the financing statement under article 9. The 1962 change in
the language of KRS 355.9-402, containing the formal require-
ment for a filed financing statement, likewise shows an attempt
to shoulder up the dual requirement of the Queenan case38 that
the financing statement be filed with the appropriate fees in
addition to the notation of lien. Language is added to KRS
355.9-402 to the effect that the "chattel mortgage or other instru-
ment" referred to in the motor vehicle law shall be deemed to
mean financing statements to be filed under article 9, ignoring
the fact that references to chattel mortgages in such law have
now been eliminated.
35 IM 186.195.3 6 Lincoln Bank and Trust Company v. Queenan, 344 S.W.2d 383, 387 (Ky.
1961). The court recognized that filing under the Code was the act which
theoretically perfects the security interest. Nevertheless, the court's upholding
the clerk's right to refuse to allow filing until there has been compliance with the
motor vehicle lien notation statute (KRS 185.195) means that both steps must
be complied with in order to have effective security in motor vehicles in most
cases. It is conceivable that a financing statement might occasionally be allowed
to be filed by a clerk without compliance with the lien notation requirement. In a
previous article, Whiteside & Lewis, supra note 5, at 74, n.52, an example of when
this might happen is mentioned in connection with the situation where there is a
financing statement broad enough to cover after-acquired equipment of the debtor
and the debtor subsequently acquires a new delivery truck which he registers in
his own name without notation of any security interest on the registration receipt.
The security interest in the truck is perfected and compliance with the motor
vehicle law has not been assured.
37KRS 186.195 (1), (3), (5).38 I.ancon Bank v. Queenan, 844 S.W.2d 883 (Ky. 1961).
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It is again submitted that a preferable solution would have
been a careful amendment of KRS 186.195 to provide an exclusive
method for perfecting security interests in registered motor ve-
Incles. Kentucky s need for a full certificate-of-title law for motor
vehicles, as well as the chief obstacles to enactment of such a law,
have already been pointed out. 9
An important exception to the dual compliance requirement
was made in the Queenan interpretation. If motor vehicles con-
stitute part of a dealer's inventory for sale the provisions of the
motor vehicle laws do not apply and filing under article 9 of the
Code remains the exclusive way to perfect the security interest.
The court reasoned that the provisions of KRS 382.675 (relating
to registration of motor vehicles prerequisite to filing of the
security interest) and KRS 186.195 (requiring the notation of
liens on copies of the registration receipt in the owner s hands
and on file with the clerk) had no application to security interests
in inventory vehicles, thus preserving the intent of the Code to
provide a simple one-time filing for a running series of transactions
so common in the case of floor-plan financing.40 The opinion ap-
plies not only to new car inventory, including dealers demon-
strator cars, but by the court's language to used car inventory as
well.41
This holding is unaffected by the 1962 amendment. The
addition of the words "required to be registered for use on the
highway" following the words "motor vehicle" in the statute
making registration prerequisite to the recording of an "instru-
ment conveying or reserving a security interest" therein seems to
be an inept attempt to amend the statute in conformity with the
decision.42 This statute, it has been previously pointed out, does
not serve any useful purpose. It is cast in the old chattel mortgage
rather than the Code terminology when it refers to the "record-
ing" of instruments conveying or reserving a security mterest.43
39 See Knpke, supra note 2, at 393; Whiteside & Lewis, supra note 5, at 76
n.54; Comment, 70 Yale L.J. 995 (1961). The cuef obstacle to adequate title
registration comes from pressures from the county clerks for a local, fee-
scheduled filing process. See Lomsville CounerjJournal, June 18, 1961, §4, p. 1.40 Lincoln Bank v. Queenan, 344 S.W.2d 383, 387 (Ky. 1961); Knpke,
Kentucky Modermzes the Law of Chattel Security, 48 Ky. L.J. 369, 388 (1960).
4i 344 S.W.2d at 387; Knpke,supra note 40, at 388.
42 KRS 382.675, as amended, Ky. Acts 1962, ch. 83, §17, at 320.
43 The provision first appeared in Ky. Acts 1958, ch. 82, amending KRS
382.675.
[Vol. 51,
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It is now the only unrepealed section remaining m the chapter on
"conveyances and encumbrances" dealing with chattel mortgages.
Its complete repeal has been recommended." Though failure to
repeal is unfortunate, the addition of the words "required to be
registered for use on the highway" amounts to recognition of the
fact that KRS 382.675 does not apply to new car inventory and
does no harm in regard to used car inventory since the registra-
tion of used cars has already taken place by the time they become
inventory 45
The 1962 amendment adopts the changes made in the 1958
Official Text of the Uniform Commercial Code in regard to
assignments of security interests.40  However, when the assign-
ment is of a security interest m a motor vehicle, the new bill mad-
vertently perpetuates an unfortunate mistake which it was pre-
viously hoped would be corrected.47 It will be recalled that the
uniform provision contemplates permissive filing of a perfected
security interest, providing in section 9-405 that a secured party
may make his assignment of record either by mdorsement on the
financing statement or by filing a separate written statement of
assignment. 8 Although of possible benefit to all interested parties
by publicizing information of the assignment, the drafters' com-
ments make clear that ling the assignment is not a condition to
continuing the perfected status of the security interest.49 In con-
trast to the Code, the motor vehicle legislation, originally enacted
in 1960 and reenacted in 1962, contains a mandatory requirement
that the statement of assignment "shall" in addition to notation
of the fact of assignment on the registration receipt, be filed
"within thirty days of the assignment."50 The statute, however,
goes on to provide that the statement of assignment "shall be
governed" by the Code provision on assignment,51 which happens
44 Whiteside & Lewis, supra note 5.
45 For a discussion of used car inventory, see Whiteside & Lewis, 50 Ky. L.J.
65, 71-72 (1961).
46 UCC §9-405.
47 See generally Whiteside & Lewis, supra note 5, at 76-79 (1961).
48 See UCC §9-405. The purpose of the changes in the 1958 text was
merely that of clarification, separating the provisions concerning the indication
of assignment in the financing statement from the provisions for a separate
instrument of assignment, making clear that only one filing fee is payable when
the assignment is indicated on the financing statement. Uniform Laws Annotated
(1958 Supp. to Uniform Commercial Code, 1957 Official Text).
49 See UCC §9-405, comment.
5O KBS 186.195(4) (a).
51 Refernng specifieally to KRS 355.9-405.
KEN rUcKY LAW jOURNAL
to be permissive. Thus the 1962 Legislature perpetuated the same
ambiguity which appeared in the 1960 legislation, purporting to
establish a mandatory requirement for compliance with a Code
provision which is permissive and demands no compliance. An
argument has already been made that this ambiguity in the motor
vehicle legislation indicates a nsunderstanding of the Code
requirements rather than a clear intention to modify the Code
and that the Code therefore should prevail, resulting in permissive
filing.52 The startling fact is that, after this defect in the 1960
legislation (created by the Legislature after adoption of the
Code) was pointed out, the 1962 Legislature nevertheless has
perpetuated the same ambiguity by enacting conflicting pro-
visions sinultaneously and in the same statute.
Summarizing the requirements for perfection of security in
motor vehicles in Kentucky, when motor vehicles constitute
dealers' inventory, filing under the Code provisions is the only
requirement, the lien notation procedure under the motor vehicle
registration law having no application. But if the motor vehicles
financed are part of the debtors equipment or consumer goods in
his hands, compliance with both the procedure for notation of the
lien on the registration receipt53 and filing a financing statement
under the Code is required. The proper place for filing is of
course determined by the classification under Code definitaons
according to the use to which the particular vehicles are put.
Specifically if the vehicles are consumer goods or equipment used
in farming operations (as defined in KRS ch. 855, art. 9), filing
must be made (a) in the County Clerk s office where the debtor
is resident or (b) if the debtor is not a resident of Kentucky in
the County Clerk's office where the vehicles are registered.
54 If
the vehicles constitute inventory or equipment used in debtor's
business (as these terms are defined) 55 filing is made (a) in the
county of the debtors residence if he is a resident of Kentucky, or
52 See generally Whiteside & Lewis, supra note 5, at 78.
53 Prescribed in KRS 186.195. Note that this procedure insures notation on
the registration receipt in possession of the owner as well as that on file in the
county clerk s office where the vehicle is registered.
54While KRS 355.9-401(1), the Uniform Commercial Code provsion as
enacted in Kentucky, says where the "goods are kept," this should be read in the
case of motor vehicles to mean the place where the vehicle is registered. KRS
186.195(2), (3), insure that the notation of lien upon the registration receipt, as
well as the financing statement, should be sent to the county clerk where the
vehicle is registered.
55 KRS 355.9-109(2), (4).
[Vol. 51,
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(b) in the county of the debtors principal place of business
within Kentucky if the debtor is not a resident of Kentucky, or
(c) in the Secretary of State s office if the debtor is not a resident
and has no principal place of business within Kentucky '6
* * * 0 *
In summary the 1962 legislation (1) achieves a very desirable
reform in updating the Kentucky's Uniform Commercial Code to
correspond with the latest draft by its sponsors; (2) repeals most
of the prior inconsistent legislation not discovered at the time of
the first enactment of the Code in Kentucky; (3) codifies the
holdings in the Queenan case, both with regard to motor vehicles
constituting inventory and to those constituting equipment or
consumer goods; (4) fills some gaps to remedy the defective
phrasing as to proper places for filing financing statements in
different situations; and (5) perpetuates and adds to the Code
itself several additional requirements for filing enacted in Ken-
tucky after the Code was adopted and not to be found in other
states which have adopted the Code.
56 ICBS 355.9-401 ( 1) (e).
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